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Abstract
We present in this paper, a non-uniform static analysis for detecting the term-substitution property
in processes speciﬁed in the spi calculus. The property is essential in deﬁning security breaches,
like secrecy and authenticity. The analysis is fully denotational, preserving compositionality and
facilitating implementations in functional programming.
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1 Introduction
The spi calculus [3] oﬀers a process algebraic theory for the modelling of mobile
cryptographic systems that essentially extends the value-passing theory of
the π-calculus [18] by the addition of primitives for performing cryptographic
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operations. We view the cryptographic operations as the value-processing
behaviour of processes. One aspect of the term-passing and term-processing
behaviours that has signiﬁcance when detecting security breaches in processes
is term substitution. Term substitutions occur whenever communications,
successful decryption, signature veriﬁcation and tuple splitting take place.
Security implications arise in scenarios where a process classiﬁed at a low
secrecy level obtains high-level data, or a process classiﬁed at a high trust
level obtains low-level data. We call the former information leakage and the
latter authenticity breach.
In this paper, we propose a non-uniform static analysis that captures the
property of term substitution in the spi calculus, and that is capable of distin-
guishing between the diﬀerent instances of these substitutions. The analysis
is based on a closed denotational model of the language derived from Stark’s
domain-theoretic equations for the π-calculus [20]. Apart from facilitating the
use of computationally important mathematical concepts, like ﬁxed-points,
the denotational approach has the advantage that it results in an implemen-
tation that is straightforward in functional programming.
The abstraction that we adopt limits, in a safe manner, the number of new
names and the depth of data structures, both of which can grow, in concrete
semantics, to an inﬁnite level as a result of the use of the replication operator.
Since the abstract semantic domain is kept ﬁnite, least ﬁxed-point calculations
are guaranteed to terminate for our monotonic semantic functions.
2 Related Work
The area of the static analysis of cryptographic processes has been researched
intensively in recent years using a variety of techniques, which one can only
mention here a few examples. These include types [2,1,7], symbolic methods
[5,16,12,13,17], abstract interpretation [19,6,15,21] and control ﬂow analysis
[8,9,11,10]. The current work expands on previous work presented in [6] for
mobile systems modelled by the π-calculus. In [6], names substituting vari-
ables were captured directly in the analysis, and limiting the number of copies
of these names was suﬃcient as an abstraction. In the spi calculus, the diﬃ-
culty with this abstraction is that complex data structures also have inﬁnite
depths, as well as containing inﬁnite number of names. This problem is solved
by the use of tags. Also, in [6], the main property of interest was privacy,
whereas here, we also deal with authenticity. Finally, the current analysis,
unlike [6], is capable of distinguishing between the diﬀerent instances of vari-
ables, which is necessary for future deﬁnitions of the properties like freshness
and resource exhaustion.
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3 A Domain-Theoretic Model
We extend Stark’s domain-theoretic model [20] by introducing the following
predomain equations, which underlie the primitive behaviour of input, output
and silent actions as well as termination (deadlock) in the spi calculus:
Spi ∼=1 + P(Spi⊥ + In + Out) (1)
In ∼=N × (T → Spi⊥) (2)
Out ∼=N × (T × Spi⊥ + N → . . . N → (T × Spi⊥)) (3)
T ∼=N + Sec + Pub + Sig + Tup (4)
Sec∼=T ×N (5)
Pub ∼=T ×N (6)
Sig ∼=T ×N (7)
Tup∼=T × . . .× T (8)
Where Spi⊥ is the domain of processes, In and Out are the predomains of
input and output actions, respectively. Input actions are modelled as pairs; a
name, N (the channel), and a function, T → Spi⊥, that can be instantiated
with a term, T , yielding a process in Spi⊥. Output actions are divided into
free and bound output actions. These are pairs consisting of the channel,
N , and either another pair, T × Spi⊥, denoting the message, T , and the
residue Spi⊥ (free outputs), or composed functions, N → . . . N → (T ×Spi⊥),
that introduce new names to the message, T , and the residue, Spi⊥ (bound
outputs). P(−) is Plotkin’s powerdomain applied to the disjoint union of
input, output and silent actions (the latter represented by Spi⊥) to construct
Spi . The one-element predomain, 1, representing terminated (deadlocked)
processes is adjoined as in [4, Def. 3.4]. The ﬂat predomain of closed terms,
T , is deﬁned as the disjoint union of the predomains of names, N , secret-key
ciphers, Sec, public-key ciphers, Pub, digital signatures, Sig and ﬁnite tuples,
Tup. The predomains Sec, Pub and Sig can be expressed as pairs, where a
term, T , is encrypted/signed with a key, N .
The following functions are deﬁned as usual, leading to Spi⊥ [4, Def. 3.3]:
∅ : 1 → Spi⊥ (9)
{| − |} : (Spi⊥ + In + Out)⊥ → Spi⊥ (10)
unionmulti : (Spi⊥ × Spi⊥) → Spi⊥ (11)
new : (N  Spi⊥) → Spi⊥ (12)
The empty set, ∅, is required to represent inactive processes. The singleton
map, {|−|}, creates elements of Spi⊥ from elements of input, output and silent
actions. new is used to interpret the eﬀects of restriction. Finally, unionmulti, is the
standard multiset union operator representing non-determinism.
Concrete elements of t ∈ T include names, a, b, c, k, secret-key ciphers,
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sec(t, k), public-key ciphers, pub(t, k), digital signatures, sig(t, k) and tu-
ples, (t1, . . . , tn). Elements p ∈ Spi⊥ include the bottom element, {|⊥|}, the
empty set, ∅ (where {|⊥|}  ∅), input actions, in(a, λy.p), free output actions,
out(a, t, p), bound output actions, out(a, λn1 . . . λnm.(t, p)) and silent actions,
tau(p). The eﬀects of restriction are interpreted by deﬁning new concretely as
in Figure 1.
new(λn.∅) = ∅
new(λn.{|⊥|}) = {|⊥|}
new(λn.{|in(a, λx.p)|}) =

∅, if a = n
{|in(a, λx.new(λn.p))|}, otherwise
new(λn.{|out(a, t, p)|}) =

∅, if a = n
{|out(a, λn.(t, p))|}, if n ∈ n(t) and n = a
{|out(a, t, new(λn.p))|}, otherwise
new(λn.{|out(a, λm1 . . . λmk.(t, p))|}) =

∅, if a = n
{|out(a, λn.λm1 . . . λmk.(t, p))|}, if n ∈ n(t) and n = a
{|out(a, λm1 . . . λmk.(t, new(λn.p)))|}, otherwise
new(λn.{|tau(p)|}) = {|tau(new(λn.p))|}
new(λn.(p1 unionmulti p2)) = new(λn.p1) unionmulti new(λn.p2)
Fig. 1. The concrete deﬁnition of new over elements p ∈ Spi⊥.
These eﬀects lead to the blocking of processes attempting to communicate
over fresh, non-extruded channels and the transformation of free outputs to
bound outputs whenever the message of communication is a fresh name. The
denotational semantics for the spi calculus can now be given as a semantic
function, S([P ]) ρ φS ∈ Spi⊥, deﬁned by the set of rules of Figure 2. The
multiset, ρ, is used to hold processes composed in parallel with the analysed
process, where rule (R0) is used to interpret the contents of ρ. The envi-
ronment, φS : V → T⊥, where V is the predomain of variables, captures
any term substitutions that occur in the semantics. The special function,
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(S1) S([0]) ρ φS = ∅
(S2) S([M(y).P ]) ρ φS = {|in(ϕS(φS ,M), λy.R([{|P |}ρ]) φS)|} where, ϕ(φE ,M) ∈ N
(S3) S([M 〈L〉.P ]) ρ φS =⊎
M ′(z).P ′∈ρ
{|tau(R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ[P ′/M ′(z).P ′]]) φS [z → ϕS(φS , L)]|}
unionmulti {|out(ϕS(φS ,M), ϕS(φS , L),R([{|P |}ρ]) φS)|}
where, ϕS(φS ,M) = ϕS(φS ,M ′) ∈ N
(S4) S([(νa)P ]) ρ φS = new(λa.R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS)
(S5) S([P | Q]) ρ φS = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ {|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS
(S6) S([!P ]) ρ φS = F(−1)
where, F(n) = let p1 = S([
n∏
i=1
P [bnv i(P )/bnv(P )] ]) ρ φS in
let p2 = S([
n+2∏
i=1
P [bnv i(P )/bnv(P )] ]) ρ φS = in
if p1 = p2 then p1 else F(n + 1)
and, bnv i(P ) = {xi | x ∈ bnv(P )}
(S7) S([if M = L then P else Q]) ρ φS ={
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , if ϕS(φS ,M) = ϕS(φS , L)
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , otherwise
(S8) S([let (x1, . . . , xn) = M in P else Q]) ρ φS =

R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′S , if ϕS(φS ,M) = (t1, . . . , tn)
where, φ′S = φS [x1 → t1, . . . , xn → tn]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , otherwise
(S9) S([case L of {x}N in P else Q]) ρ φS =

R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′S , if ϕS(φS , L) = sec(t, k) and ϕS(φS , N) = k
where, φ′S = φS [x → t]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , otherwise
(S10) S([case L of {[x]}N in P else Q]) ρ φS =

R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′S , if ϕS(φS , L) = pub(t, k+) and ϕS(φS , N) = k−
where, φ′S = φS [x → t]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , otherwise
(S11) S([case L of [{x}]N in P else Q]) ρ φS =

R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′S , if ϕS(φS , L) = sig(t, k−) and ϕS(φS , N) = k+
where, φ′S = φS [x → t]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φS , otherwise
(R0) R([ρ]) φS =
⊎
P∈ρ
S([P ]) (ρ\{|P |}ρ) φS
Fig. 2. The denotational semantics of the spi calculus.
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ϕS : (V → T⊥) × Term → T , returns the semantic value of a term, given
substitutions recorded by φS as follows:
ϕS(φS ,M) =


φS(M), if M ∈ V
M, if M ∈ N
sec(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = {M ′}N
pub(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = {[M ′]}N
sig(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = [{M ′}]N
(ϕS(φS ,M1), . . . , ϕS(φS ,Mn)), if M = (M1, . . . ,Mn)
Note that since we only deal with closed terms, the case where M = x ∈ V
and φS(x) = ⊥ will never be encountered (the case of open terms).
The description of rules (S1)–(S11) is as follows. Rule (S1) interprets the
meaning of a null process as the empty set mapping, ∅. Rules (S2) and (S3)
deal with processes guarded with input and output actions, respectively. The
rule for output actions, (S3), considers communications between the output
channel and appropriate input channels guarding processes in ρ. The φS
is updated appropriately with semantic elements. Rule (S4) uses the new
mapping to interpret the meaning of a restriction. Rule (S5) interprets directly
parallel composition by the addition of the parallel subprocesses to ρ.
Finally, rule (S6) interprets a replicated process, !P , by calculating the
higher-order function, F : N→ Spi⊥, starting from the bottom number, n =
−1, which computes the bottom semantic element, F(−1) = {|⊥|}. The value
of n is increased by 2 in each iteration to allow for any interactions between
the copies of the replication to take place. This continues until the least ﬁxed-
point is reached. Due to the fact that the semantic domain, Spi⊥, is inﬁnite,
this calculation may not terminate within ﬁnite limits. The rule also uses the
labelling mechanism to rename all the bound names and variables, bnv(P ),
of the spawned processes by subscripting those variables and names with a
number signifying each spawned copy. Since this renaming of bound variables
and names is, in fact, α-conversion, the resulting process on the right side of
the rule is structurally equivalent to a subprocess of the replication on the left
side. This preserves the compositionality of the denotational semantics.
The rest of the rules rely on the meaning of terms as held by the φS
environment before resolving the analysed process. In rule (S7), the meaning
of two terms is compared, and depending on the result, one of two processes
is chosen and added to ρ. Rules (S8)–(S11) deal with tuple splitting and
cryptographic processes. The result of the tuple splitting and cryptographic
B. Aziz et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 118 (2005) 19–3624
operations are used to update the φS with the appropriate semantic terms. A
residual process, P , signifying the success of the operation is also added to ρ.
In case an operation fails, an alternative process, Q, is chosen and added to ρ.
4 Non-Standard Semantics
The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus extends the standard denota-
tional semantics introduced in Section 3, where term substitutions are recorded
in a special environment φE : V → ℘(T ) that maps each variable of a closed
process to the set of semantic terms that may substitute that variable during
the evaluation of the meaning of a process. Since the non-standard seman-
tics is precise (copies of bound names and variables are always distinct), each
variable will be mapped to a singleton set at most per choice of control ﬂow,
representing the term that substitutes the variable.
A domain, D⊥ = V → ℘(T ), can be constructed, ordered by subset inclu-
sion:
∀φE1, φE2 ∈ D⊥ : φE1 D⊥ φE2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ V : φE1(x) ⊆ φE2(x)
With the bottom element, ⊥D⊥ , being the null environment, φE0, that maps
each variable to the empty set. The union of environments operation, ∪φ, can
also be deﬁned as follows:
∀φE1, φE2 ∈ D⊥, x ∈ V : (φE1 ∪φ φE2)(x) = φE1(x) ∪ φE2(x)
The non-standard semantic domain is formed by pairing D⊥ with the standard
semantic domain, Spi⊥, resulting in Spi⊥ ×D⊥. The bottom element of this
domain is the pair (⊥Spi⊥,⊥D⊥). The non-standard semantics for the spi
calculus can now be deﬁned by the semantic function, E([P ]) ρ φE ∈ (Spi⊥ ×
D⊥), on the structure of P as in Figure 3.
The ρ multiset holds all the processes in parallel with the process under
interpretation. The deﬁnition of the ϕE : (V → ℘(T )) × Term → T func-
tion allows for the meaning of a term to be computed under a particular φE
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(E1) E([0]) ρ φE = (∅, φE)
(E2) E([M(x).P ]) ρ φE = ({|in(ϕE (φE ,M), λx.p′)|}, φE)
where, (p′, φ′E) = R([{|P |}ρ]) φE and, ϕE (φE ,M) ∈ N
(E3) E([M 〈L〉.P ]) ρ φE =
(
⊎
M ′(z).P ′∈ρ
{|tau(p′)|} unionmulti {|out(ϕE(φE ,M), ϕE(φE , L), p′′)|},
⋃
φ
M ′(z).P ′∈ρ
φ′E ∪φ φE)
if, ϕE (φE ,M) = ϕE(φE ,M ′) ∈ N
where, (p′, φ′E) = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ[P ′/M ′(z).P ′]]) φE [z → {ϕE(φE , L)}]
and, (p′′, φ′′E) = R([{|P |}ρ]) φE
(E4) E([(νa)P ]) ρ φE = (new(λa.p′), φ′E) where, (p′, φ′E) = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE
(E5) E([P | Q]) ρ φE = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ {|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE
(E6) E([!P ]) ρ φE = F(−1)
where, F(n) = let v1 = E([
n∏
i=1
P [bnv i(P )/bnv(P )] ]) ρ φE in
let v2 = E([
n+2∏
i=1
P [bnv i(P )/bnv(P )] ]) ρ φE in if v1 = v2 then v1 else F(n + 1)
and, bnv i(P ) = {xi | x ∈ bnv(P )}
(E7) E([if M = L then P else Q]) ρ φE =
{
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , if ϕE(φE ,M) = ϕE(φE , L)
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , otherwise
(E8) E([let (x1, . . . , xn) = M in P else Q]) ρ φE =


R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE [x1 → {t1} . . .
xn → {tn}],
if ϕE(φE ,M) = (t1, . . . , tn)
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , otherwise
(E9) E([case L of {x}N in P else Q]) ρ φE =


R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE [x → {t},
if ϕE(φE , L) = sec(t, k)
and ϕE(φE , N) = k
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , otherwise
(E10) E([case L of {[x]}N in P else Q]) ρ φE =


R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE [x → {t}],
if ϕE (φE , L) = pub(t, k+)
and ϕE(φE , N) = k−
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , otherwise
(E11) E([case L of [{x}]N in P else Q]) ρ φE =


R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE [x → {t}],
if ϕE (φE , L) = sig(t, k−)
and ϕE(φE , N) = k+
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φE , otherwise
(R0) R([ρ]) φE = (
⊎
P∈ρ
p′,
⋃
φ
P∈ρ
φ′E), where, (p
′, φ′E ) = E([P ]) (ρ\{|P |}ρ) φE
Fig. 3. The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus.
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environment:
ϕE(φE ,M) =


t, if M ∈ V ∧ φE(M) = {t}
M, if M ∈ N
sec(ϕE(φE ,M ′), ϕE(φE , N)), if M = {M ′}N
pub(ϕE(φE ,M ′), ϕE(φE , N)), if M = {[M ′]}N
sig(ϕE(φE ,M ′), ϕE(φE , N)), if M = [{M ′}]N
(ϕE(φE ,M1), . . . , ϕE(φE ,Mn)), if M = (M1, . . . ,Mn)
The semantic rules are described as follows. In (E1), the meaning of a null
process is described as the pair (∅, φE), where φE is the environment supplied
to the rule initially. Rules (E2) and (E3) deal with the cases of input and
output actions, respectively. Communications are dealt with in (E3) for output
actions, therefore, φE remains unchanged in (E2) for input actions. The rule
for output actions requires that terms used as channels should evaluate to
names, and communications occur whenever an input channel is matched in
ρ. The value of φE is updated with the message term substituting the input
parameter. Rule (E4) interprets the meaning of a restriction using the new
operation on the ﬁrst element of the resulting pair, whereas the second element
reﬂects the environment resulting from the residue. This is justiﬁed as internal
communications are preserved by restriction. Rule (E5) composes two parallel
processes in ρ.
The replication of processes is dealt with in rule (E6) by computing a
special function, F : N→ Spi⊥×D⊥, starting at the bottom number, n = −1,
and incrementing n by 2 until we reach a least ﬁxed-point for v1 ∈ Spi⊥×D⊥.
Such a computation is not guaranteed to terminate due to the inﬁnite nature
of the non-standard semantic domain, Spi⊥×D⊥. Also, α-conversion renames
the set of bound names and variables of each process copy, while maintaining
the compositionality of the semantics. Rule (E7) deals with a conditional
process, where the meaning of the overall process is chosen from the two
branch processes based on the semantic equality of the compared terms. Pair
splitting is dealt with in rule (E8) where the φE is updated to hold the result
of the substitution of local variables by elements of a tuple. The rest of
the rules (E9)–(E11) deal with cryptographic processes performing secret-key
decryption, public-key decryption and digital signature veriﬁcation.
The correctness requirement for the non-standard semantics of the spi cal-
culus, with respect to its standard semantics, is expressed in the following
theorem, which states that the standard element of the non-standard seman-
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tics is equivalent to the value obtained from the standard semantics..
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the Non-Standard Semantics)
∀P ∈ P : (S([P ]) ρ φS = p) ∧ (E([P ]) ρ φE = (p′, φ′E)) ⇒ p = p′
Proof . The proof is by induction on the standard and non-standard semantics.

5 Abstract Semantics
We begin by assuming a ﬁnite predomain of tags, Tag , ranged over by t, t˙, t¨,
where t is the tag of a generic term, t˙ is the tag of a primitive term (name, vari-
able) and t¨ is the tag of a complex term (ciphertext, signature, tuple). Next
we tag (sub)terms of the analysed process with unique tags. More precisely,
we tag M in the constructs let (x1, . . . , xn) = (M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q,
case {M}L of {x}N in P else Q, case {[M ]}L of {[x]}N in P else Q,
case [{M}]L of [{x}]N in P else Q and N〈M〉.P .
For example, tagging the term {({a}c, {b}e)}d yields {({at˙1}t¨1c , {bt˙2}t¨2e )t¨3}t¨4d .
The following functions are also deﬁned over tags, terms and processes:
– value of ({t1, . . . , tn}) = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. This function can be applied to a set
of tags, {t1, . . . , tn}, returning the corresponding set of terms, {M1, . . . ,Mn}.
Hence, value of ({t˙1, t¨4}) = {at˙1, {({at˙1}t¨1c , {bt˙2}t¨2e )t¨3}t¨4d }.
– tags of (P ) = {t1, . . . , tn}. This function returns the set, {t1, . . . , tn}, of tags
used in a process, P .
For example: tags of (m〈at˙1〉.m〈{(bt˙2, ct˙3)t¨1}t¨2k 〉.0) = {t˙1, t˙2, t˙3, t¨1, t¨2}.
– untag({M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}) = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. When applied to a set of tagged
terms, {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}, this function removes all associated tags yielding a set
of untagged terms, {M1, . . . ,Mn}. Hence:
untag({at˙5, {(at˙1, {bt˙2}t¨2e )t¨3}t¨4d }) = {a, {(a, {b}e)}d }. The function behaves
as id if a term, M ′, has no tags.
We now introduce the αk,k′ abstraction function, which keeps to a ﬁnite
level, the number of copies of bound variables, names and tags.
Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne αk,k′ : N× N× (V + N + Tag) → (V  + N  + Tag):
∀M ∈ (V +N+Tag), i, k, k′ ∈ N : αk,k′(M) =


t˙k, if M = t˙i ∈ Tag and i > k
t¨k′, if M = t¨i ∈ Tag and i > k′
xk, if M = xi ∈ V and i > k
ak, if M = ai ∈ N and i > k
M, otherwise
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The resulting abstract predomains, V , N  and Tag, can be deﬁned as V  =
V \{xj | j > k}, N  = N\{aj | j > k} and Tag = Tag\({t˙j | j > k} ∪
{t¨i | i > k′}). Informally, k constrains the number of bound variables and
names, and tags of primitive terms, whereas k′ constrains the number of tags
of complex terms. In eﬀect, constraining the tags of primitive terms implies
limiting the copies of bound names and variables carrying the tags, whereas
constraining the number of tags of complex terms means limiting the depth
of data structures.
For example, in the process !(ν n)a〈nt˙〉 | !a(x), it is possible to spawn
inﬁnite copies of each replication, (νn1)a〈nt˙11 〉 | a(x1) | (νn2)a〈nt˙22 〉 | a(x2) |
. . .. It is clear that t˙ is an indicator to the number of copies n has after
spawning each process. On the other hand, the process !a(x).a〈{x}t¨k〉 | a〈b〉,
which also spawns a(x1).a〈{x1}t¨1k 〉 | a(x2).a〈{x2}t¨2k 〉 | a〈b〉 | . . . demonstrates
the role of t¨ as an indicator to the number of times the ciphertext, {x}k, is
applied to b.
Using the αk,k′ abstraction, we construct the abstract environment φA :
V  → ℘(Tag), which maps each abstract bound variable of the analysed
process to a set of tags, representing terms that could substitute that variable
during the abstract semantics. An abstract domain D⊥ = V
 → ℘(Tag ) is
formed ordered by subset inclusion:
∀φA1, φA2 ∈ D⊥, x ∈ V  : φA1 D⊥ φA2 ⇔ φA1(x) ⊆ φA2(x)
The bottom element, ⊥D⊥, is the null environment, φA0, mapping each variable
to {}. Taking D⊥ as the abstract semantic domain, we can deﬁne the abstract
semantics of the spi calculus by the function A([P ]) ρ φA ∈ D⊥, as in Figure
4. ρ again is a multiset of processes in parallel with the analysed process. The
special function, ϕA : (V  → ℘(Tag )) × Term → ℘(Term), returns a set of
terms corresponding to a term, M , given substitutions captured by φA:
ϕA(φA,M) = ϕ′A(φA,M
′){},
where, M ′ = M [αk,k′(t)/t][αk,k′(x)/x][αk,k′(n)/n]
and ϕ′A(φA,M)s = if M ∈ s then {} else
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(A1) A([0]) ρ φA = φA (A2) A([M(x).P ]) ρ φA = φA
(A3) A([M 〈Lt〉.P ]) ρ φA = (
⋃
φ
M ′(z).P ′∈ρ
φ′A) ∪φ φA
if, untag(ϕA(φA,M)) ∩ untag(ϕA(φA,M ′)) ∩ N 
= {}
where, φ′A = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ[P ′/M ′(z).P ′]]) φ′′A
and, φ′′A = φA[αk,k′(z) → φA(αk,k′ (z)) ∪ {αk,k′(t)}]
(A4) A([(νa)P ]) ρ φA = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA
(A5) A([P | Q]) ρ φA = R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ {|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA
(A6) A([!P ]) ρ φA = F(−1) where, F(n) = let φ1 = A([
n∏
i=1
ren(P, i) ]) ρ φA in
let φ2 = A([
n+2∏
i=1
ren(P, i) ]) ρ φA in if φ1 = φ2 then φ1 else F(n + 1)
and, ∀x ∈ bnv(P ), t ∈ tags of (P ) : ren(P, i) = (P [xi/x])[ti/t]
(A7) A([if M = L then P else Q]) ρ φA ={
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, if, untag(ϕA(φA,M)) ∩ untag(ϕA(φA, L)) 
= {}
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, otherwise
(A8) A([let (x1, . . . , xn) = M in P else Q]) ρ φA =

⋃
φ
(M
t1
1 ,...,M
tn
n )∈ϕA(φA,M)
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′A if, ∃(M t11 , . . . ,M tnn ) ∈ ϕA(φA,M)
where, φ′A = φA[αk,k′(x1) → φA(αk,k′ (x1)) ∪ {αk,k′(t1)}, . . . ,
αk,k′ (xn) → φA(αk,k′ (xn)) ∪ {αk,k′(tn)}]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, otherwise
(A9) A([case L of {x}N in P else Q]) ρ φA =

⋃
φ
{Mt}n∈ϕA(φA,L)
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′A, if, n ∈ ϕA(φA, N)
where, φ′A = φA[αk,k′(x) → φA(αk,k′ (x)) ∪ {αk,k′ (t)}]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, otherwise
(A10) A([case L of {[x]}N in P else Q]) ρ φA =

⋃
φ
{[Mt]}n+∈ϕA(φA,L)
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′A, if, n− ∈ ϕA(φA, N)
where, φ′A = φA[αk,k′(x) → φA(αk,k′ (x)) ∪ {αk,k′ (t)}]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, otherwise
(A11) A([case L of [{x}]N in P else Q]) ρ φA =

⋃
φ
[{Mt}]n−∈ϕA(φA,L)
R([{|P |}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φ′A, if, n+ ∈ ϕA(φA, N)
where, φ′A = φA[αk,k′(x) → φA(αk,k′ (x)) ∪ {αk,k′ (t)}]
R([{|Q|}ρ unionmultiρ ρ]) φA, otherwise
(R0) R([ρ]) φA =
⋃
φ
P∈ρ
A([P ]) (ρ\{|P |}ρ) φA
Fig. 4. The abstract semantics of the spi calculus.
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

⋃
L∈value of(φA(untag(M)))
ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} if M ∈ V
{M}, if, M ∈ N
{∀N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} : {N ′}tL′}, if, M = {N}tL
{∀N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} : {[N ′]}tL′}, if, M = {[N ]}tL
{∀N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} : [{N ′}]tL′}, if, M = [{N}]tL
{∀M ′1 ∈ ϕ′A(φA,M1)s∪{M}, . . . ,M ′n ∈ ϕ′A(φA,Mn)s∪{M} :
(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
n)
t }, if, M = (M1, . . . ,Mn)t
The description of the rules is as follows. Rules (A1) and (A2) return the
φA environment unchanged. Communications are dealt with in rule (A3)
for output actions, where synchronising output and input channels yield a
communication, in which the tag of the message is captured by φA. The
semantics is imprecise, since φA only captures an abstract tag as a value for
an abstract variable. Rules (A4) and (A5) deal with the cases of restriction
and parallel composition directly by placing the subprocesses with the rest in
ρ. The rule for replication, (A6), performs a least ﬁxed-point calculation using
a special function, F : N→ D⊥. This least ﬁxed-point occurs at the minimum
number, n, such that A([
n∏
i=1
ren(P, i) ]) ρ φA = A([
n+2∏
i=1
ren(P, i) ]) ρ φA. The
termination property of this calculation is stated formally in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Termination of the least ﬁxed-point calculation)
The calculation of rule (A6) terminates.
Proof. To prove the termination property, it is necessary to satisfy two re-
quirements. First, the semantic domain must be ﬁnite. This is satisﬁed by
the deﬁnition of D⊥. The second requirement is to prove the monotonicity
of A([
n∏
P ]) ρ φA, i.e. A([
n∏
P ]) ρ φA  A([
n+2∏
P ]) ρ φA. To prove this,
we simplify the inequality into A([ Q ]) ρ φA  Aπ([ Q | P ]) ρ φA, where
Q =
n∏
P . This is further simpliﬁed to become A([ Q ]) ρ φA  Aπ([ Q ]) ρ′ φA,
where ρ′ = ρ unionmultiρ {|P |}ρ. This can be proven by induction over A([ P ]) ρ φA.
In particular, the most interesting cases are rules (A3) and (A8)–(A11),
where φA changes. For example, in rule (A3), we have that since ρ ⊆ ρ′,
then M ′(y).P ′ ∈ ρ ⇒ M ′(y).P ′ ∈ ρ′. From this we can conclude that
A([ Q ]) ρ φA  A([ Q ]) ρ′ φA, since the environment resulting fromA([ Q ]) ρ φA
will necessarily be a subset of the environment resulting from A([ Q ]) ρ′ φA
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(i.e. the larger system induces more term substitutions). 
The rule for replication also uses the labelling mechanism to α-convert the
set of bound names and variables of each copy of the replication, bnv(P ),
as well as its set of tags. This renaming retains the compositionality of the
semantics. The rule for conditional processes, (A7), relies on the equality of
two untagged terms under φA. If in the case that the equality does not hold,
a diﬀerent alternative process is chosen. The rule for tuple splitting, (A8),
attempts to split elements of a set of tuples corresponding to the value of
ϕA(φA, L) of a term, L. The φA environment is updated with the tags of the
elements of each tuple. In case no tuples exist in the set, an alternative process
is chosen and φA is left unchanged. The rest of the rules, (A9)–(A11), deal
with cryptographic processes. Again, a process attempts to decipher (verify)
a term, L, closed by ϕA(φA, L). The tags of the deciphered terms are added to
φA. Else a diﬀerent process is chosen without aﬀecting φA. Finally, rule (R0)
groups all the environments resulting from the interpretation of processes in
ρ with the union of environments operation, ∪φ.
We can state the safety of the abstract semantics by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Safety of the abstract semantics for the spi calculus)
(E([P ]) ρ φE = (p, φ′E)) ∧ (A([P ]) ρ φA = φ′A) ∧
(∃M ∈ Term : ϕE(φE ,M) ∈ φE(x) ⇒ ∃t ∈ φA(αk,k′(x)) : value of ({t}) =
{M ′} ∧ untag(M ′) = (∀y ∈ bnv(M) : M [αk,k′(y)/y]))
⇒ (∃M ∈ Term : ϕE(φ′E ,M) ∈ φ′E(x) ⇒ ∃t ∈ φ′A(αk,k′(x)) : value of ({t}) =
{M ′} ∧ untag(M ′) = (∀y ∈ bnv(M) : M [αk,k′(y)/y]))
Proof . The proof is by induction over the structure of the abstract semantics.

The theorem states that for any term, M , captured in the non-standard se-
mantics by including its ϕE(φ′E ,M) value in the value of a variable, φ
′
E(x),
then that will correspond to capturing a tag, t, in the abstract semantics, by
φ′A(αk,k′(x)). The appropriateness of t is expressed by the ability to obtain
an abstract form, ∀x ∈ bnv(M) : M [αk,k′(x)/x], of the concrete term, M ,
by evaluating t using value of and untagging the resulting term, M ′, using
untag . More concisely, every concrete term, M , captured in the non-standard
semantics is captured as the corresponding abstract tag, t, in the abstract
semantics.
B. Aziz et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 118 (2005) 19–3632
6 Secrecy and Authenticity
To reason about the secrecy and authenticity properties of a system, it is
necessary to give formal deﬁnitions of these properties with respect to the
result of the static analysis, i.e. φA. We start by assuming that S and A are
ﬁnite chains of secrecy and trust levels, respectively, where l, l′ ∈ S and a, a′ ∈
A. A well-deﬁned security policy, controlled by the system administrators,
classiﬁes (sub)processes of a system with their secrecy and trust levels using
the S and A chains, and according to the security requirements of the system.
Furthermore, let ξS : (N ∪V) → S and ξA : (N ∪V) → A be two environ-
ments that map the new names and variables of classiﬁed processes, P l and
P a, to their secrecy and trust levels, respectively. The null environments are
deﬁned as: ∀x ∈ N ∪ V : ξS0(x) = ⊥S , ξA0(x) = ⊥A. To construct a general
environment ξ for some classiﬁed process, the function Z is deﬁned over the
structure of P z as in Figure 5, where ξ = ξS whenever z ∈ S, and ξ = ξA
whenever z ∈ A.
Z(0z) ξ = ξ
Z(M(y).P z) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[y → z]
Z(M〈N〉.P z) ξ = Z(P ) ξ
Z((ν a)P z) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[a → z]
Z(P | Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ ∪ξ Z(Q) ξ
Z(!P z) ξ = Z(P ) ξ
Z(if M = N then P else Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ ∪ξ Z(Q) ξ
Z(let (x0, . . . , xn−1) = M in P else Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[x0 → z, . . . , xn−1 → z] ∪ξ
Z(Q) ξ[x0 → z, . . . , xn−1 → z]
Z(case L of {x}N in P else Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[x → z] ∪ξ Z(Q) ξ[x → z]
Z(case L of {[x]}N in P else Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[x → z] ∪ξ Z(Q) ξ[x → z]
Z(case L of [{x}]N in P else Qz) ξ = Z(P ) ξ[x → z] ∪ξ Z(Q) ξ[x → z]
Fig. 5. Deﬁnition of the Z function over classiﬁed processes.
The rules use the ∪ξ operation deﬁned as follows:
∀x ∈ N ∪ V : (ξ1 ∪ξ ξ2)(x) = ξ1(x) unionsq ξ2(x) (13)
The use of unionsq is due to the fact that x can be deﬁned in one environment at
most, ξ1 or ξ2. One may now deﬁne the following secrecy and authenticity
threats:
Property 1 (Information Leakage & Authenticity Breach) Given a pro-
cess P , the static analysis environment φA = A([P ])s ρ0 φA0, and the environ-
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ments ξS and ξA, then the information leakage and authenticity breach threats
occur whenever the following conditions hold true:
∃x ∈ dom(φA), y ∈ φA(x) : ξS(x)  ξS(y) (Information Leakage)
∃x ∈ dom(φA), y ∈ φA(x) : ξA(x)  ξA(y) (Authenticity Breach)
The information leakage property captures instances where names created by
high-secrecy-level processes are obtained by processes classiﬁed at low secrecy
levels. The word obtained refers to substitutions occurring as a result of input
actions or the success of cryptographic and tuple-splitting operations. On
the other hand, the direction of concern in the authenticity breach property
is reversed. Here, the authenticity requirements of a high-trust-level process
are breached whenever it inputs a name, or decrypts, veriﬁes or splits a term
resulting in a name, which was created by a less trusted process.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a static analysis for security properties in cryptographic
processes modelled by the spi calculus. The analysis is characterized as be-
ing fully denotational; this leads to implementations that are closely related
to functional programming. The applicability of the analysis in detecting in-
stances of information leakage and authenticity breaches was demonstrated
for a number of cryptographic protocols, with the results shown in Figure 6.
All of these protocols were analysed in the presence of an intruder process,
I, such that I represents the most general attacker of Dolev-Yao [14]. The
analysis is then performed by applying A([Protocol ]) {|I|} φA, where Protocol
is the speciﬁcation of the protocol.
Future work is under way to expand the analysis to be able to use the non-
uniformity of the domain of φA in deﬁning security properties, in particular,
the freshness property. This non-uniformity also permits the deﬁnition of
a resource exhaustion property based on a cost-resource relationship, where
variables denote the available resources and the captured names, the cost.
plain
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